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WHY BIVENS WON’T DIE: THE LEGACY OF PEOPLES V. 
CCA DETENTION CENTERS 
LUMEN N. MULLIGAN† 
ABSTRACT 
Interpreting recent Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit in Peo-
ples v. CCA Detention Centers held that a federal prisoner confined in a 
privately run prison may not bring a Bivens suit against the employees of 
a private prison for violations of his constitutional rights when alterna-
tive state-law causes of action are available.  The author first reviews the 
Supreme Court's evolving Bivens jurisprudence and turns next to an 
overview of the Tenth Circuit's opinion.  Third, the author argues that, 
despite the Tenth Circuit's new approach, putative constitutional claims 
brought under state-law theories of recovery will often be “re-
federalized” producing uniform federal liability rules and federal juris-
diction.  The author concludes that should the Supreme Court truly wish 
to end the practice of implying causes of action from the Constitution, it 
must reconsider a whole host of federal common law and jurisdictional 
doctrines—a course of action the Court may find unpalatable. 
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In what may become a landmark prisoner’s rights ruling, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Peoples v. CCA Deten-
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tion Centers1 held that a federal prisoner confined in pre-trial detention in 
a privately run prison operating under contract with the United States 
Marshal Service may not bring a Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcot-
ics Agents2 claim against the employees of the federal-contractor prison 
for violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights when alternative 
state-law causes of action are available.3  The Peoples case raises several 
concerns.  As the dissent notes, it is at least questionable whether the 
majority opinion: (a) conforms with Supreme Court precedent, (b) prop-
erly rejects the principle of parallelism between prisoner’s rights in pub-
licly and privately run prisons, (c) appropriately denigrates the uniform-
ity of federal rights, and (d) deters future constitutional violations in pri-
vately run prisons.4  Moreover, given the growth in the use of privately 
run federal prisons,5 decisions such as Peoples, which, absent diversity, 
deprive federal prisoner plaintiffs of a federal forum for putative consti-
tutional claims, may well foist portions of the substantial costs of pris-
oner litigation onto the state courts.6  Finally, the Peoples case also raises 
the issue of federalization of putative constitutional tort claims, which is 
the focus this article. 
Many jurists and scholars have leveled challenges to the propriety 
of implying federal causes of action directly under the Constitution since 
the Supreme Court first decided Bivens.7  Many have argued that imply-
ing the Bivens cause of action directly from the Constitution violates 
  
 1. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).  Indeed, just prior to the publication of this article, the 
Fourth Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's approach to Bivens actions brought against employees of 
privately run federal prisons.  Holly v. Scott, No. 05-6287, 2006 WL 60276, at *9 (4th Cir. Jan 12, 
2006) (adopting Peoples).  
 2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal agents acting under color of federal law may be 
found liable for monetary damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment).  Conventionally speak-
ing a Bivens action is the federal equivalent of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.  See generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 523–44 (2d ed. 1994); SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 16–22 (1995). 
 3. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108. 
 4. Id. at 1108–13 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 5. See Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 340-41 (2001) (concluding 
private prisons will continue to exist and grow in the United States not replacing public prisons, but 
competing with them and stimulating improvement of the total prison system); Clifford J. Rosky, 
Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 879, 902-03 (2004); Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A 
Private Sector Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2218 (1998) (“The number 
of inmates in private prisons is expected to grow thirty percent per year.”).  
 6. See generally Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2003) 
(discussing the efficacy of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act in reducing costs of prisoner litigation 
in the federal courts). 
 7. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 31–54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); John C. Jeffries, The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 52 (1985); Thomas S. Schrock & 
Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1135-38 
(1978).  But see Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1822 (1991) (praising the Court’s decision to hold indi-
vidual officers liable for constitutional violations as genius). 
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principles of separation of powers.8  Several commentators have noted 
that the ability to imply causes of action is simply beyond the powers 
conferred upon the federal courts altogether.9  Others have noted a host 
of pragmatic concerns that arise from implying causes of action directly 
under the Constitution.10  Given these many concerns, the Court has been 
loath to expand the scope of the Bivens cause of action since 1980.11  
Indeed, the Court’s post-1980 Bivens jurisprudence may be fairly charac-
terized as a “slow death” of the implied constitutional cause of action.12 
In this article, I argue that the Peoples opinion illustrates that the 
Court’s slow-death approach to the Bivens claim does not attain the goal 
of ending federal-court-created liability rules for constitutional torts.  I 
contend that putative constitutional tort claims brought by federal prison-
ers in privately run prisons under state-law theories of recovery are often 
embedded with federal issues capable of conferring a federal liability 
rule and federal jurisdiction.  I proceed as follows:  part I provides a brief 
outline of the Court’s slow-death methodology to eliminating the Bivens 
cause of action; part II reviews the opinion in Peoples; and, part III con-
siders two quandaries lurking in Peoples.  First, many putative constitu-
  
 8. In Carlson, Justice Rehnquist states:  
In my view, it is ‘an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us’ for this 
Court to infer a private civil damages remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other 
constitutional provision.  The creation of such remedies is a task that is more appropri-
ately viewed as falling within the legislative sphere of authority. 
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 250 (1979) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[U]ntil Congress legislates otherwise as to employment standards for its 
own staffs, judicial power in this area is circumscribed. The Court today encroaches on that bar-
rier.”); Merrill, supra note 7, at 19–24 (arguing that inferring causes of action violates the principle 
of separation of powers); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 7, at 1127–28 (same). 
 9. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring ) (“Bivens is a relic of the heady 
days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action – decreeing them 
to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.”); Schrock & 
Welsh, supra note 7, at 1127 (arguing that the power of judicial review does not include the power to 
infer causes of action). 
 10. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 428 (Black, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that Bivens would “choke” the courts with lawsuits and prognosticating that a 
Bivens remedy would open the door for frivolous suits that would inevitably delay an already slow 
path of justice); Jeffries, supra note 7, at 101-02 (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education would 
never have been decided if school districts had been subject to money damages and that constitu-
tional rights would have stagnated); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 7, at 1146–71 (considering a 
detailed list of “realists” concerns). 
 11. The Malesko court noted:  
In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide 
an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted 
unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alterna-
tive remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional conduct. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70. 
 12. See generally Matthew G. Mazefsky, Note, Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko: 
Unmasking the Implied Damage Remedy, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 639, 661-62 (2003) (concluding that 
Malesko marks the final throws of the cause of action implied directly under the Constitution); 
Mariana Claridad Pastore, Comment, Running From the Law: Federal Contractors Escape Bivens 
Liability, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 867-69 (2002) (same); Andrea Robeda, Note, The Death of 
Implied Causes of Action: The Supreme Court’s Recent Bivens Jurisprudence and the Effect on State 
Constitutional Tort Jurisprudence: Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,  33 N.M. L. REV. 401 
(2003) (same).  
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tional torts pursued as state-law claims may be subject to preemption 
under the government contractor doctrine, which provides a federal li-
ability rule and an avenue back to federal court.  Second, many putative 
constitutional claims that are filed under state-law theories of recovery 
will incorporate a constitutional rule as the standard of care, which is 
sufficient under the “necessary construction test” to gain federal subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Finally, I argue that the Court’s slow-death approach 
to the Bivens cause of action achieves its goal of ending the era of im-
plied constitutional causes of action in form only.  In substance, many of 
these putative constitutional actions will be “re-federalized”.  I conclude 
that, if the Court truly wishes to end “the heady days in which [it] as-
sumed common-law powers to create causes of action,”13 it must recon-
sider a much broader scope of jurisdictional and federal common law 
doctrines; a prospect it may find unattractive. 
I. THE SLOW DEATH OF BIVENS V. SIX UNKNOWN FEDERAL NARCOTICS 
AGENTS14 
In Bivens,  the Supreme Court held that a “violation of [the Fourth 
Amendment] by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives 
rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitu-
tional conduct.”15  Mr. Bivens had alleged that federal agents, under 
color of federal law, illegally restrained him, searched his home, and 
arrested him.16  The lower courts dismissed Mr. Bivens’ action, agreeing 
with the defendants’ argument that Mr. Bivens’ proper remedy lay in a 
state-law trespass claim.17  The Supreme Court reversed.18 
The Bivens Court rejected the notion that the protections afforded 
under the Fourth Amendment are strictly co-extensive to those found 
under state law.19  Indeed, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is 
an independent check upon federal power consistently applied through-
out the country, which “is not tied to the niceties of local trespass 
laws.”20  Moreover, the Court held that the interests protected under 
state-law trespass and invasion of privacy doctrines and those interests 
protected under the Fourth Amendment may be inconsistent with, or 
even hostile to, each other.21  For example, the Court noted that to bring a 
state-law trespass claim the plaintiff must show that he did not allow the 
  
 13. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  For a fuller discussion of the Bivens cause of action, Professor 
Chemerinsky provides a thorough review.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 523–44. 
 15. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969); Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 18. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. 
 19. Id. at 392–94. 
 20. Id. at 393–94. 
 21. Id. at 394. 
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defendant into the home.22  But the Court reasoned that an officer “who 
demands admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far dif-
ferent position” from the typical trespasser.23  As a result, the Court con-
cluded that, in most cases, a mere invocation of authority by a federal 
official will cause the average citizen to allow the official access to the 
home, rendering trespass doctrine an ineffective remedy against abuses 
of federal power.24     
Finally, the Court held that the provision of monetary damages was 
the appropriate remedy for a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.25  
The Court acknowledged that it lacked a statutory basis for providing 
this remedy and that “the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words 
provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the con-
sequences of its violation.”26   Nevertheless, the Court held that it could 
imply such a cause of action directly from the Constitution when three 
conditions were met.  First, the implication is appropriate when there is a 
federal statute (viz., 42 U.S.C. § 1983) granting a general right to sue for 
constitutional violations.27  Second, the implication is appropriate when 
there are no special factors counseling hesitation, such as making a claim 
upon the federal fisc, weighing against extending a cause of action.28  
Third, the implication is appropriate when there is no explicit congres-
sional declaration stating that money damages may not be awarded for 
constitutional violations caused by federal agents.29 
Despite the expansive language in Bivens itself, the Court has held 
that a Bivens action lies against federal officers for money damages on 
only two other occasions.30  In Davis v. Passman,31 the Court held that 
plaintiff could bring a cause of action for monetary damages for viola-
tions of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.32  In Carlson v. 
Green,33 the Court held that a federal claim lies against federal prison 
officials for violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment.34   
  
 22. Id. at 394. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 395. 
 26. Id. at 396. 
 27. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).  What the Court means by “general 
right to sue” in this context is far from clear.  Section 1983 is limited to actions against state offi-
cials.  See, e.g., Wheedlin v. Wheller, 373 U.S. 647, (1963) (holding federal agents are not liable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  Thus, at the time Bivens was decided there was not a general right to sue 
federal agents for constitutional violations, merely a general right to sue state agents. 
 28. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
 29. Id. at 396–97. 
 30. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 31. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 32. Id. at 243–44. 
 33. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 34. Id. at 20. 
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Faced with a series of rebukes concerning the appropriateness of 
implying causes of action directly under the Constitution, the Court, 
since Carlson, has restricted the scope of Bivens claims.35  In Chappell v. 
Wallace,36 issued just three years after Carlson, the Court refused to hear 
a Bivens action brought by military personnel who, lacking any remedy, 
alleged that the unconstitutional actions of their superior officers injured 
them.37  Harkening to the limitations upon implying causes action first 
laid out in Bivens itself,38 the Court held that a special factor counseled 
hesitation in hearing a Bivens claim in such circumstances: namely “the 
unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress’ 
activity in the field.”39  The Court, in United States v. Stanley,40 later 
reaffirmed that a Bivens action is unavailable against members of the 
military “whenever the injury arises out of activity ‘incident to [military] 
service.’”41   
In addition to refusing to hear military claims, the Court now 
broadly allows Congress to create alternative federal remedies to a 
Bivens action.42  In Bush v. Lucas,43 the Court declined to hear a Bivens 
claim alleging First Amendment violations brought by government em-
ployees when they had access to alternative “comprehensive procedural 
and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the 
United States.”44  Relying on the notion, introduced in Passman45 and 
Carlson,46 that Congress can create alternative remedies to a Bivens 
claim, the Bush Court ruled that the congressionally installed administra-
tive system could supplant a Bivens cause of action.47  The Bush Court, 
however, went one step further than the Passman and Carlson decisions.  
In Passman and Carlson, the Court reasoned that alternative congres-
sionally created remedies to a Bivens action were acceptable as long as 
they were “viewed as equally effective” to a Bivens claim.48  The Court 
in Bush, by contrast, found a congressionally created alternative remedy 
sufficient to bar a Bivens action, even though the administrative 
scheme’s  “remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff,”49 
  
 35. See cases cited supra note 7. 
 36. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 37. Id. at 303–04.  
 38. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing “no special factors counseling hesitation”).  
 39. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304. 
 40. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 41. Id. at 681 (citing the “incident to service”  test from Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 
144 (1950)). 
 42. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).  
 43. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 44. Id. at 367. 
 45. Passman, 442 U.S. at 248. 
 46. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–20. 
 47. Bush, 462 U.S. at 386. 
 48. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19; Passman, 442 U.S. at 248. 
 49. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388.  See also David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine 
Whether an Implied Cause of Action Under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of 
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so long as Congress “provide[d] meaningful remedies.”50  Following this 
same tack, the Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky51 barred Bivens claims filed 
by disabled social security beneficiaries who lacked monetary relief for 
emotional distress due to delays in receiving their Social Security bene-
fits.52  As in Bush, the Court relied upon Congress’ creation of alterna-
tive, although not equivalent, administrative relief to prohibit the Bivens 
claim.53  
The Court further limited who may be a proper defendant in a 
Bivens action in FDIC v. Meyer.54  Here, the Court held that the logic of 
Bivens itselfwhich is founded upon individual, not agency, liabil-
itydoes not support hearing Bivens claims against federal agencies.55  
The Meyer Court concluded that “[i]f we were to recognize a direct ac-
tion for damages against federal agencies, we would be creating a poten-
tially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government.”56  As the 
Bivens Court itself held that such a result should counsel hesitation in 
implying a cause of action directly under the Constitution,57 the Meyer 
Court took this potential fiscal impact as a ground for barring a Bivens 
claim.58 
Although the Court has spent fifteen years chipping away at the 
edges of the Bivens cause of action, prior to Correctional Services Cor-
poration v. Malesko,59 the following generalizations could be made about 
the Court’s Bivens jurisprudence.  First, a Bivens claim was considered a 
free-standing, generally implied, cause of action independent of state 
law.60  Second, the Court considered it fundamental that federally em-
ployed agents be subject to uniform rules, be it under Bivens or a con-
gressionally created alternative for constitutional violations.61  Third, a 
  
the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REV. 683, 694 (1985) (contending that after Davis and Carlson the 
Court abandoned the “equally effective” approach). 
 50. Bush, 462 U.S. at 386. 
 51. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 52. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424–25. 
 53. Id. at  429 (“Congress . . . has addressed the problems created by state agencies’ wrongful 
termination of disability benefits” through the creation of administrative remedies). 
 54. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 55. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 473. 
 56. Id. at 486 (internal citation omitted). 
 57. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (noting that in the instant case, “we are not dealing with a ques-
tion of ‘federal fiscal policy . . . .’”). 
 58. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486. 
 59. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 60. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392–94; Robeda, supra note 12, at 405; Pastore, supra note 12, at 854; 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 526–31. At least one commentator finds that a Bivens remedy is still 
“generally” available post-Malesko.  See Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 
Litigation: Supreme Court Review, A Round Table Dialogue, 19 TOURO L. REV. 625, 678 (2003) 
(Professor Chemerinsky asserting:  “[A]lthough the Court is continuing to narrow Bivens, it is not 
overruling or signaling an overruling of Bivens. The core of Bivens is that if a federal officer violates 
a constitutional right, there is generally a remedy available. That has not been overturned.”).  
 61. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424–29 (finding uniform and comprehensive administrative 
relief available); Bush, 462 U.S. at 368 (same); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23 (“the liability of federal 
officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules.”); 
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Bivens claim could only be brought against individual defendants—not 
agencies of the federal government.62  Fourth, although the Court had 
only explicitly approved of Bivens actions for violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the 
courts of appeals considered the Bivens action generally available for any 
constitutional violation.63  Fifth, a Bivens action was not appropriate 
when Congress provided meaningful, alternative forms of relief, even if 
that relief did not provide plaintiffs with complete satisfaction.64  Finally, 
Bivens claims were precluded in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress when there were special factors counseling hesitation.65  These 
  
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 393-94 (holding that the Fourth Amendment “is not tied to the niceties of local 
trespass laws.”). 
 62. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 471.  Some consider this focus upon individual liability an ingen-
ius means of skirting sovereign immunity and like doctrine.  Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 7, at 1822 
(praising the Court’s decision to hold individual officers liable for constitutional violations as gen-
ius).  Others, however, see this focus on individual liability as little more than form over substance.  
See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individ-
ual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L. J. 65-7 (1999) (arguing that as a result of governmental 
indemnification and government-provided defense individuals are not in practice liable under 
Bivens).  Given that the Department of Justice’s Constitutional and Specialized Tort Branch is de-
voted to defending federal officers against Bivens suits at public expense, Pillard’s point is a strong 
one.  See http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/brochure/brochure.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).  Moreover, 
the key premise of the Meyer decision—that individual, not agency, liability is the key to deter-
rence—runs contrary to the fundamental tort principle of respondeat superior, as well as common 
sense.  Compare Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 (“It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to 
deter the officer.”) with DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 907 (2000) (considering, in the context 
of justifying the respondeat superior rule, that “the best deterrence is to impose liability upon the 
employer, who will then seek to avoid his own liability by exercising his considerable control over 
employees to discourage their torts.”). 
 63. See Carlson 446 U.S. at 23 (Eighth Amendment); Passman, 442 U.S. at 228 (Fifth 
Amendment); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388 (Fourth Amendment).  The lower courts, however, have heard 
Bivens claims for a broader set of constitutional violations.  See, e.g., Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 
990 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiff’s allegations of unconstitutional delegation of Article III authority to 
law clerks and staff attorneys in pro se proceedings would appear to state [a Bivens] claim.”); Ruff v. 
Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2001) (remanding a Ninth Amendment Bivens claim); 
Hammond v. Kunard, 148 F.3d 692, 694–95 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding a Sixth Amendment Bivens 
claim against a qualified immunity challenge); National Commodity and Barter Ass’n v. Archer, 31 
F.3d 1521, 1527 (10th Cir. 1994) (“We likewise hold that if claims of violations of First . . . 
Amendment rights are proven, then a Bivens remedy may be afforded to the plaintiffs for recovery of 
damages for such constitutional wrongs.”). 
 64. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424–29; Bush, 462 U.S. at 368, 386–88.  This alternative 
remedy doctrine raises many issues, which are beyond the scope of this article but worthy of note.  
See, e.g., Susan Brandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 SO. CAL. L. REV. 
289 (1995) (arguing that Bivens stands for the proposition that judicial enforcement of constitutional 
rights through monetary damages should not depend on action by Congress); Betsy J. Grey, Preemp-
tion of Bivens Claims: How Clearly Must Congress Speak?, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1087 (1992) (argu-
ing that Bivens actions are available except where Congress clearly states its intent to supersede 
them); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 
1129 (1989) (“It is surprising, as I have indicated, that Bivens decisions, while employing the form 
of constitutional interpretation, concede a willingness to be reversed by Congress”); Walter E. 
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1552–53 
(1972) (“[W]here the judiciary independently infers remedies directly from constitutional provisions, 
Congress may legislate an alternative remedial scheme which it considers equally effective in en-
forcing the Constitution and which the Court, in the process of judicial review, deems an adequate 
substitute for the displaced remedy.”). 
 65. See Nichol, supra note 64, at 1142–53 (critiquing the Court’s “special factors” approach). 
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factors included: (a) potential direct claims upon the federal fisc;66 and 
(b) the potential to interfere with the unique nature of the military.67 
The Supreme Court’s recent Malesko decision may further limit the 
general availability of the Bivens action dramatically.68  Mr. Malesko, a 
federal prisoner living in a privately run halfway house, had a heart con-
dition that entitled him to use the elevator to access his fifth floor room 
despite the general policy requiring inmates to use the stairs.69  One eve-
ning upon his return, an employee of the halfway house required him to 
climb the stairs, which resulted in Mr. Malesko suffering a heart attack.70  
Mr. Malseko then brought a Bivens suit alleging Eighth Amendment 
violations against the halfway house, which was run by a private corpo-
ration under contract with the United States Bureau of Prisons.71  The 
Court held that such a suit could not be brought against federal contrac-
tors who operate prisons, providing three rationales for its decision.72 
First, the Court stated that the purpose of a Bivens action is to deter 
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations—
not governmental agencies or corporate entities.73  Relying heavily on 
Meyer, the Court held that “threat of suit against an individual’s em-
ployer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens.”74  Rea-
soning by analogy to Meyer, the Malesko Court stated that if corporate 
defendants were available for suit under Bivens, prisoner plaintiffs would 
focus their suits against the corporate employer and not the individual 
directly responsible for the injury.75  The Court concluded that the logic 
of Meyer foreclosed hearing a Bivens action against a corporate entity.76 
While this no-entity-liability principle was seemingly sufficient to 
decide the case, the Court went on to provide two more rationales for its 
decision.77  The second factor provided by the Malesko Court as ground-
  
 66. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
 67. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).  
The courts of appeals have relied upon several other special factors to bar a Bivens action.  See, e.g., 
Beattie v. Boeing Co., 43 F.3d 559, 563 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that “that the predominant issue of 
national security clearances amounts to such a special factor counseling against recognition of a 
Bivens claim in this case.”).   
 68. See, e.g., Mazefsky, supra note 12 (concluding that Malesko marks the final throws of the 
cause of action implied directly under the Constitution); Robeda, supra note 12 (same); Pastore, 
supra note 12 (same).  But see Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 60, at 678 (stating the Malesko 
does not overrule the core holding of Bivens). 
 69. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 63. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 71.   
 74. Id at 70; see also Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 (“If we were to imply a damages action directly 
against federal agencies . . . there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions 
against individual officers.  [T]he deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.”). 
 75. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71. 
 76. Id. 
 77. There is a strong argument to be had that these following two rationales, then, are merely 
obiter dicta.   
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ing for its ruling was the need to maintain parity between the remedies 
afforded prisoners at privately operated facilities and those at govern-
ment-operated facilities (the “symmetry principle”).78  Thus, the Court 
rejected Mr. Malesko’s Bivens claim against the private prison, at least in 
part, because federal prisoners incarcerated in federally run facilities do 
not have plaintiff’s contemplated remedy.79  That is to say, because fed-
eral prisoners in government-run facilities may not bring a Bivens suit 
against the guard’s employer (i.e., the United States or the Bureau of 
Prisons) federal prisoners in privately run prisons may not bring Bivens 
suits against their corporate jailors. 80  If such an asymmetry is to be im-
posed, the Court reasoned that Congress was better positioned to impose 
it.81  
Finally, the Court reasoned that the existence of alternative reme-
dies precluded a Bivens claim (the “alternative-relief principle”).82  The 
Court pointed to two alternative remedies available to Mr. Malesko.83  
The Court first stated, unexceptionally given its prior case law in Bush 
and Chilicky, that the possibility of administrative relief within the Bu-
reau of Prisons (i.e., alternative, congressionally created, administrative 
relief) precludes a Bivens claim.84  In a move that was quite exceptional 
given its rulings in Bivens and Carlson which reject the notion that state 
torts sufficiently protect constitutional interests, the Court stated that Mr. 
Malesko’s claim was quintessentially one for negligence and, thus, a 
state-law tort claim was available to remedy his constitutional claim.85   
The Court’s over-determination of its holding in Malesko has only 
fostered confusion.  Even assuming each Malesko factor (i.e., the no-
entity-liability principle, the symmetry principle, and the alternative-
relief principle) is sufficient standing alone to bar a Bivens claim, 86 the 
Malesko decision raises the further question of whether the existence of 
alternative federal remedies, alternative state-law remedies, or both 
  
 78. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–72. 
 79. Id. at 71. 
 80. Id. at 72. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (finding that Mr. Malesko was not “confronted with a situation in which claimants in 
[his] shoes lack effective remedies.”). 
 83. Id. at 72–74. 
 84. Id. at 74; see also 28 C.F.R. § 542.10; Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 413 (holding that the exis-
tence of alternative federal remedies is sufficient, standing alone, to bar a Bivens suit); Bush, 462 
U.S. at 368 (same).   
 85. Compare Malesko, 534 U.S. at 73 with Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (“the 
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional rights should be governed by 
uniform rules.”) and Bivens, 403 U.S. at 393–94 (holding that the Fourth Amendment “is not tied to 
the niceties of local trespass laws.”). 
 86. There are good reasons to make this assumption.  See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484–85 (holding 
that the no-entity-liability principle, standing alone, is sufficient to bar a Bivens action); Schweiker, 
487 U.S. at 421 (holding that the federal alternative relief principle, standing alone, is sufficient to 
bar a Bivens action); Bush, 462 U.S. at 388–90 (same).   
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barred Mr. Malesko’s Bivens claim.87  If Malesko, properly understood, 
endorses the view that the existence of a state-law remedy standing alone 
precludes a Bivens action against a private defendant, then the Malesko 
Court has radically departed from its past Bivens jurisprudence.88  This 
issue is of particular importance in Bivens suits against employees of 
privately run federal prisons because in such suits Malesko’s  no-entity-
liability principle and the symmetry principle are inapposite.89  More-
over, given that the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative remedies are avail-
able only to persons under its authority,90 a suit brought by a federal pre-
trial detainee who is under the authority of the U.S. Marshal Service 
would test whether the existence of a state-law remedy standing alone 
forecloses a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor run-
ning a private prison.  
II.  PEOPLES V. CCA DETENTION CENTERS91 
The Tenth Circuit faced just such a perfect storm of facts in Peo-
ples.  In a case of first impression in the federal courts of appeals post 
Malesko,92 the Tenth Circuit held that the existence of a state-law remedy 
  
 87. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (presenting both sets of alternative remedies as grounds for 
barring a Bivens claim). 
 88. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.  Indeed, prior to Malesko, the Courts of 
Appeals regularly heard Bivens claims against private defendants acting under color of federal law 
without a determination that plaintiff lacked a state-law alternative remedy.  See, e.g., Vector Re-
search, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
Bivens claim may be brought against a private actor if the defendant was acting under color of fed-
eral law); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); 
Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 
667 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 
282, 308 (D. Mass. 1999) (same).  The First Circuit, pre-Malesko, appears to assume that such an 
action is appropriate.  See Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Serv., Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir. 1983).  
Prior to Malesko, three courts of appeals had declined to answer whether a plaintiff may assert a 
Bivens claim against a private actor.  See DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger Silas Mason Co., Inc., 844 
F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 930-31 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987); 
McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 75-76 (8th Cir. 1976).  Notably, prior to Malesko, only 
the First Circuit, in dicta, had stated that “[w]hile federal officers may, at times, be subject to suit for 
unconstitutional behavior . . . there is no cause of action against private parties acting under color of 
federal law or custom.”  Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 932 n.8 (1st 
Cir. 1974).  As is illustrated above, however, the First Circuit appeared to reject this dicta by 1983.  
See Gerena, 697 F.2d at 449.  In any event, no circuit predicated the existence of a Bivens claim 
upon the absence of a state-law remedy. 
 89. This question was specifically reserved by the Court.  Malesko, 534 U.S. at 65 (“the 
parties agree that the question whether a Bivens action might lie against a private individual is not 
presented here.”).  In fact, both parties to the Malesko case assumed that a Bivens action would lie 
against employees of privately run prisons, which may have affected the Court’s decision.  See Brief 
of Petitioner, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 53566, at 
*13; Brief of Respondent, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 
WL 883679 at *8, *12. 
 90. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2001) (Bureau of Prisons administrative remedies “do[ ] not apply to 
inmates confined in other non-federal facilities”). 
 91. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 92. But see Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (assuming 
in dicta that plaintiff may bring a Bivens claim against a guard at a privately run, federal, pretrial, 
detention center); Sanusi v. INS, 100 Fed. Appx. 49, 52 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (remanding 
the question).  Two District Courts have substantively addressed the issue.  See Sarro v. Cornell 
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standing alone forecloses a Bivens action against employees of a federal 
contractor running a private prison.93   
Peoples is a consolidated appeal combining two suits, both brought 
pro se by Mr. Peoples in the District of Kansas.94  In the first case (“Peo-
ples I”),95 Mr. Peoples brought a Bivens claim alleging that, while being 
held in pretrial detention, staff at the privately run prison failed to protect 
him from other inmates after he repeatedly requested protection.96  As a 
result of the staff’s failure to protect him, Mr. Peoples contends that other 
inmates beat him with padlocks, chains, and full soda cans.97  Mr. Peo-
ples clearly states an Eighth Amendment violation sufficient to survive a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion if he has a means of 
bringing the cause of action.98  Under the Eighth Amendment, prison 
officials have an obligation to protect prisoners from attack by other 
prisoners.99  As the Supreme Court has held, a “prison official’s ‘deliber-
ate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment.”100  As such, if Mr. Peoples had been 
housed in a government-run prison, these allegations would have given 
rise to a Bivens claim.101  The district court in Peoples I reasoned, how-
ever, that because Mr. Peoples was housed in a privately run facility and 
a state-law tort claim was available, Malesko precluded a Bivens ac-
  
Corrs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D.R.I. 2003) (holding that existence of a state-law remedy 
standing alone does not foreclose a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor running a 
private prison); see also Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 362 (D.N.J. 2004) (adopting Sarro).  At 
the time this article was written, there apparently was no scholarly treatment of this issue. 
 93. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1103 (“Therefore, we will not imply a Bivens cause of action for a 
prisoner held in a private prison facility when we conclude that there exists an alternative cause of 
action arising under . . . state . . .  law against the individual defendant for the harm created by the 
constitutional deprivation.”). 
 94. Id. at 1093.  Mr. Peoples did obtain counsel for his appeal of Peoples I. 
 95. Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., No. Civ.A. 03-3129-KHV, 2004 WL 74317 (D. Kan. 
Jan. 15, 2004) (Vratil, J.) (unpublished) [hereinafter Peoples I]. 
 96. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093–94. 
 97. Id. at 1094. 
 98. The court notes that because Mr. Peoples is a pretrial detainee, his claim is technically a 
Fifth Amendment due process claim.  Id. at 1094 n.1.  Nevertheless, because the standard is the same 
under either the Fifth or Eighth Amendment, the court, for ease of reference, refers to this failure to 
protect claim as an Eighth Amendment violation.  Id.  I follow the court in this regard. 
 99. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citation omitted, alteration omitted).  For 
the purposes of this article, I will assume that federal contractors, and their employees, act under 
color of federal law when operating a federal prison.  See Rosborough v. Mngt. & Training Corp., 
350 F.3d 459, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding, in light of Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 
61, 72n.5 (2001) and Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (holding that a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 plaintiff may sue privately employed prison guards because they are state actors operating 
under color of state law).  Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the District Courts in Peoples address the 
element of acting under color of federal law.  But given the strong parallels between a Bivens and § 
1983 action, there is good reason to believe that these courts would apply the Fifth Circuit’s Rosbor-
ough approach in the Bivens context.   
 100. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828.   
 101. See, e.g., Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that deliberate 
exposure of federal inmate housed in a federally run penitentiary to risk of harm at hands of other 
inmates violates the Eighth Amendment giving rise to a Bivens claim).   
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tion.102  The district court, therefore, dismissed the claim for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.   
In the second case (“Peoples II”),103 Mr. Peoples alleged three 
Bivens claims.104  The first claim arose out of the thirteen months he 
spent in administrative segregation on the direct order of the Marshal 
Service, who considered him a flight risk.105  Mr. Peoples did not receive 
written notice of the reason for his segregation upon his request and he 
was not allowed a hearing on his segregation status for five months, 
which he contended violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights.106  
Mr. Peoples also alleged that while in segregation he lacked sufficient 
access to legal materials and that his phone calls to his attorney were 
monitored, both of which he contended violated his due process rights.107  
The district court in Peoples II rejected the notion that Malesko bars a 
Bivens suit against employees of a privately run prison, but nevertheless 
dismissed all three due process claims on the merits for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.108 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first held that the Peoples I district 
court erred in treating as jurisdictional the issue of whether the existence 
of a state-law relief precludes a Bivens action.109  The circuit relied pri-
marily on Bell v. Hood110 in its jurisdictional analysis.111  In Bell, the 
Supreme Court held that complaints seeking to recover directly under the 
Constitution raise a federal question sufficient to ground subject matter 
jurisdiction, excepting two scenarios.112  The Tenth Circuit concluded 
that neither exception set forth in Bell applied.113  First, the court as-
sumed without discussion that the Peoples complaints were not artfully 
pleaded merely to gain federal jurisdiction.114  Second, the court quickly 
dispensed with the notion that Mr. Peoples’ complaints were insubstan-
tial.115  The court concluded, then, that Bell directly controlled and ad-
  
 102. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1094. 
 103. Peoples v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 02-3298, 2004 WL 2278667 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 2004) 
(Murgia, J.) (unpublished) [hereinafter Peoples II]. 
 104. Id. at *1.   
 105. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1094. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1095. 
 109. Id. at 1095–96.  Judge Ebel, who generally dissents from the majority’s opinion, concurs 
in this aspect of the majority’s decision.  Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 110. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
 111. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1095. 
 112. Bell, 327 U.S. at 681–82. 
 113. See Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1096. 
 114. Id. at 1095 (holding that complaints that “clearly appear[ ] to be immaterial or made solely 
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” should be dismissed under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 115. Id. at 1095 (discussing insubstantiality of the complaint); see also Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–
83 (holding that complaints that are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” should be dismissed under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
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monished litigants not to conflate the lack of a cause of action with lack 
of federal subject matter jurisdiction.116   
Next, the Tenth Circuit held “that there is no implied private right of 
action for damages under Bivens against employees of a private prison 
for alleged constitutional deprivations when alternative state . . . causes 
of action for damages are available to the plaintiff.”117  The circuit rec-
ognized that this holding was in tension with the Supreme Court’s Carl-
son decision.118  Nevertheless, by adopting something akin to a last-in-
time rule, which may be a questionable interpretive tool,119 the Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that given the Supreme Court’s evolving Bivens juris-
prudence it was most prudent to resolve ambiguities among the Court’s 
decisions by relying upon its most recent pronouncements on the topic 
made in Malesko.120  The circuit concluded that “the purpose of Bivens is 
only ‘to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against indi-
vidual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally [as in Carlson], 
or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative 
remedy [as in Davis].’”121  As a consequence, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the existence of an alternative state-law remedy bars a Bivens claim 
against employees of federal contractors.122 
The court next turns its attention, sua sponte, to the existence of al-
ternative state-law claims for Mr. Peoples’ Bivens suits.123  First, it holds 
that Mr. Peoples could have brought his Eighth Amendment, failure-to-
protect claim under Kansas common law as prison guards owe a duty of 
reasonable care to safeguard a prisoner in their custody from attack by 
  
 116. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1095–96 n3.  See also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and 
Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 643 (2005) (arguing that federal courts err by treating factual ele-
ments of substantive federal causes of action, such as an interstate commerce or employee numer-
ousity requirement, as going to the jurisdiction of the federal court).  Although a full discussion of 
this issue is beyond the scope of this article, there is reason to think that the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdic-
tional analysis is wrong-headed given its case-by-case implication approach.  Here, the court dis-
misses Mr. Peoples’ claims without considering the merits of his claim or the merits of an affirma-
tive defense.  The dismissal of Mr. Peoples’ claims walk and talk like a common law plea in abate-
ment not a demurrer, corresponding more to a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) motion than to a FED. R. CIV. 
P. 12(b)(6).  Cf. Wasserman, supra, at 649–53 (discussing the “first phase” of litigation where juris-
dictional questions are properly addressed). 
 117. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101. 
 118. Id.  
 119. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[I]t is [the Supreme] Court’s preroga-
tive alone to overrule one of its precedents.”). 
 120. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1102. 
 121. Id. at 1101 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70).  It is worth noting that the Tenth Circuit 
chose not to refer to this text from Malesko as a holding, but rather referenced it as “statements.”  
This suggests, perhaps, that even the Tenth Circuit considers Malesko’s presentation of the alterna-
tive-remedy principle as obiter dicta.  Nevertheless, from the Tenth Circuit’s point of view, the status 
of this rationale as dicta is immaterial.  See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 
1996) (“[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the 
Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later state-
ments.”). 
 122. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101. 
 123. Id. at 1103. 
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other inmates.124  The court then considers Mr. Peoples’ Fifth Amend-
ment, monitoring-of-his-phone-conversations claim.125  The Tenth Cir-
cuit again concludes that a Kansas cause of action, this time implied 
from criminal statutory prohibitions, exists to remedy the alleged in-
jury.126  The court then dismissed both claims for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted because Mr. Peoples had alternative 
state-law causes of action.127 
The Tenth Circuit cryptically treats Mr. Peoples two remaining 
Fifth Amendment claims (viz., improperly being held in segregation and 
inadequate access to the courts).  The court states that it “need not even 
look to state law causes of action because we agree with the District 
Court that Mr. Peoples’s allegations . . . do not rise to the level of a con-
stitutional violation.”128  The court then proceeds to consider these 
Bivens claims on their constitutional merits and dismisses them under 
Rule 12(b)(6).129  The court, however, does not state whether an alterna-
tive state-law cause of action exists for these claims nor does it state 
whether these Bivens claims, although failing on the merits, were appro-
priately brought as Bivens actions.130  One suspects that the Tenth Circuit 
took this approach precisely because Kansas law does not provide an 
alternative tort remedy for these Fifth Amendment violations.131  While 
this lack of clarity does not offer direction to future litigants or the lower 
courts, it appears fair to summarize the court’s holding as producing a 
doctrine where Bivens suits must be reviewed claim-by-claim to deter-
mine whether an alternative state-law action is available.  Under this 
regime, Bivens claims without a state-law analogue will (presumably) be 
legitimately filed and proceed to an on-the-merits review, while Bivens 
claims with a state-law analogue should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.132   
  
 124. Id. at 1104 (quoting Washington v. State, 839 P.2d 555, 559 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 125. Id. at 1105.  
 126. Id. at 1107–08 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001 to –4002 (2005)); Kan. Op. Atty. 
Gen. No. 93-93 (1993)). 
 127. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1105; see also id. at 1108.   
 128. Id. at 1105. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 1113 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (discussing this point). 
 131. Proving a negative is always difficult, but the author of this article diligently searched for 
an alternative Kansas remedy to the improper administrative detention and inadequate access to the 
courts claims against a private actor.  The closest conceivable action to the administrative detention 
claim would be a false imprisonment claim.  See Brown v. State, 927 P.2d 938, 940 (Kan. 1996) 
(providing elements of false imprisonment).  The author was unable to unearth a Kansas-law ana-
logue to the access to the courts claim. 
 132. The dissent strongly critiques this approach.  “Thus, what we have here under the majority 
opinion is a framework where some, but not all, due process violations should be brought as Bivens 
actions and some should be brought as state-law tort suits.”  Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J., 
dissenting).  Such an approach is “an intensely fact-driven endeavor,” id. at 1112, that is inappropri-
ate given that the doctrinal inquiry here is whether a cause of action exists, providing “yet another 
reason why the majority’s reasoning is flawed.” Id. at 1113.   
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Assuming that the Peoples court133 correctly reads Malesko to com-
mand this result, the Tenth Circuit faces a prima facie Supremacy Clause 
problem.134  Under the traditional understanding of a Bivens claim as a 
free-standing cause of action independent of state law,135 it could appear 
that the circuit has employed a “reverse preemption” doctrine whereby a 
state-law claim preempts a federal Bivens claim.  That it to say, one 
could read Peoples as holding that the plaintiff had two Bivens claims 
that were preempted by the existence of Kansas tort claims.  Of course, 
such a reverse preemption theory is doctrinal heresy.136   
While the court does not address this issue directly, the better read-
ing of Peoples illustrates that the Tenth Circuit avoids this prima facie 
Supremacy Clause problem.  The court achieves this result by implicitly 
rejecting the traditional understanding of the Bivens claim.137  Instead of 
viewing Bivens as implied generally, the circuit views Bivens actions as 
implied claim-by-claim.  This understanding is first evidenced during the 
court’s claim-by-claim analysis of whether analogous state-law actions 
exist.  The court concludes each of these analyses by rendering a claim-
specific ruling on whether to imply a Bivens cause of action.138  This 
claim-by-claim approach is further evidenced during the court’s discus-
sion of the Malesko symmetry principle.139  The Tenth Circuit recognizes 
that under its ruling federal prisoners incarcerated in privately run pris-
ons lack a remedy (i.e., a Bivens suit against individual officers) that is 
available to federal prisoners held in government-run facilities.140  While 
recognizing this as violating Malesko’s symmetry principle, the court 
states, “it was not created by this decision.”141  “An implied right,” the 
  
 133. The reader will excuse this little joke. 
 134. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). 
 135. See supra note 60. 
 136. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971) 
(“For just as state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment, neither 
may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can be exercised.”); M'Culloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819) (“It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obsta-
cles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate govern-
ments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence.”); Roberts v. Roadway Express, 
Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1105 (10th Cir. 1998) (“If [Defendant] means to argue that Colorado’s Work-
ers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for all work-related injuries including emo-
tional distress caused by violations of the [federal] civil rights laws, that argument is readily dis-
posed of by the Supremacy Clause.”). 
 137. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (outlying the traditional understanding). 
 138. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1105 (“Therefore, because Kansas law gives rise to a cause of action 
for damages for the injuries Mr. Peoples suffered as the result of the alleged deprivation of his 
Eighth Amendment rights, we will not imply an additional cause of action directly under the Consti-
tution in Peoples I.”); Id. at 1108 (“We conclude, then, that Mr. Peoples could have brought suit 
under Kansas law [for the alleged unlawful monitoring of his phone calls].  Therefore, we will not 
imply a Bivens claim as to this allegation.”). 
 139. Id. at 1103. 
 140. Id. at 1102. 
 141. Id. at 1103. 
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court goes on to explain, “by definition, is created by the courts and can-
not exist until it is judicially announced.”142    
In essence, the Tenth Circuit’s view is that a Bivens cause of action 
only springs into existence when no alternative remedy is available.  
Prior to that moment, the federal cause of action simply does not exist.  
The presence of alternative state-law relief, then, does not preempt plain-
tiff’s federal Bivens action under the Tenth Circuit’s view, but rather the 
existence of the state-law relief fails to provide a condition precedent for 
the creation of the Bivens action by implication.  Thus, state-law reme-
dies do not displace the federal Bivens action under the circuit’s view 
because in those cases where alternative state-law remedies exist there 
simply is no federal cause of action to displace. 
While the court appears to avoid the Supremacy Clause problem, it 
is unclear exactly why Bivens claims with a state-law analogue should be 
dismissed as a procedural matter.  While the court does make clear that 
such dismissals are not jurisdictional,143 it fails to address whether the 
existence of alternative state-law claims acts as an element of plaintiff’s 
claim or an affirmative defense.  Neither choice is attractive.  On the one 
hand, there appears to be little authority to treat the lack of an alternative 
state-law action as an element of the Bivens claim.144  On the other hand, 
if the existence of an alternative state-law claim is an affirmative defense 
the reverse preemption problem rears its ugly head again, because but for 
the state-law defense plaintiff would have a federal cause of action.  
Moreover, an affirmative defense can be waived,145 potentially leaving a 
federal court with the unsavory duty of litigating a “non-existent” federal 
cause of action. 
Given the increasingly complex legal analysis imposed by the Peo-
ples regime coupled with the possibility for dismissal without the court 
addressing the merits of a plaintiff’s claim, it may be appropriate for 
district courts to exercise their discretion to dismiss putative Bivens 
claims without prejudice when they conclude that alternative state-law 
causes of action bar the claim,146 allowing prisoner plaintiffs to refile 
their claims under the state–law theory.  Indeed, dismissal without preju-
dice seems especially appropriate here as the overwhelming majority of 
prisoner-plaintiffs proceed pro se.147  Of course, this ability to refile as-
  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1095–96. 
 144. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding post Male-
sko that “the elements of a Bivens claim [are properly pleaded] by alleging a violation of his consti-
tutional rights by agents acting under the color of federal law.”). 
 145. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).   
 146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). 
 147. See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se 
Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479–80 (2002) (“The majority of prison-
ers proceed pro se in these actions [civil prisoner constitutional rights litigation]—ninety-six percent 
according to a recent survey.”). 
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sumes that the statute of limitations will not have run, which would sty-
mie any such attempt.  Nevertheless, most state saving statutes would 
provide prisoner-plaintiffs an additional window of opportunity to refile 
a state claim if the statute of limitations had run while the Bivens claim 
was pending as long as the first dismissal is entered without prejudice.148     
The difficulties created by the majority’s application of Malesko do 
not end here.  Judge Ebel, while recognizing that this was a hard case, 
strongly dissents and calls for the Supreme Court to take up the issue of 
Bivens suits against employees of federal contractors.149  He begins his 
analysis by arguing that the majority opinion fails to give Carlson its 
due.150  Judge Ebel argues that Supreme Court precedent does not treat 
alternative causes of action as fungible, but rather requires that alterna-
tives to a Bivens action be alternative constitutional causes of action.151  
Next, Judge Ebel contends that the majority violates the Malesko sym-
metry principle, because a Bivens action against staff is available to fed-
eral prisoners in government-run facilities but not in privately run facili-
ties. Also, in Judge Ebel’s view, the majority violates the traditional par-
allelism between a Bivens action and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, because 
a § 1983 action against staff members is available to state prisoners held 
in private prisons but a Bivens action is not available to federal prisoners 
incarcerated in private facilities.152  Fourth, Judge Ebel asserts that the 
majority, contrary to the Court’s directives in Bivens and Carlson, ren-
ders the enforcement of federal rights non-uniform by making a Bivens 
action contingent upon the vagaries of state law.153  Finally, Judge Ebel 
  
 148. For instance, under Kansas law:  
If any action be commenced within due time, and the plaintiff fail in such action other-
wise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall have expired, the plain-
tiff, or, if the plaintiff die, and the cause of action survive, his or her representatives may 
commence a new action within six (6) months after such failure. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-518 (2005).  In Kansas, examples of such judgments “not on the merits” 
include: denial of class certification for lack of numerosity, Waltrip v. Sidwell, 678 P.2d 128, 133 
(Kan. 1984); dismissal for failure to file an amended petition following a partially successful motion 
for a more definite statement, Barrett v. Porter, 408 P.2d 574 (Kan. 1965); dismissal without preju-
dice, Cox v. Trousdale, 27 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1933); and dismissal for voidable service of process, 
Goldsberry v. Lewis, 574 P.2d 566 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). 
 149. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 n.2 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 1108–10. 
 151. Id. at 1109. 
 152. Id. at 1110–12. 
 153. Id. at 1112–13.  The District of Rhode Island, in rejecting the claim-by-claim approach 
later adopted by the Tenth Circuit, offered this further critique: 
[W]hile Malesko indicates that the existence of state law remedies may be a factor to be 
considered, in applying Bivens, state law remedies cannot be construed as a manifestation 
of Congressional intent to preclude the application of Bivens.  Indeed, making the federal 
remedies available to a federal prisoner at a privately operated institution contingent upon 
whether there are adequate alternative state law remedies would require a case by case 
analysis of state law and would cause the availability of a Bivens remedy to vary accord-
ing to the state in which the institution is located, a result that Bivens, itself sought to 
avoid. 
Sarro v. Cornell Corrs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D.R.I. 2003).  
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warns that the majority’s opinion will fail to deter future constitutional 
violations.154  
III.  LATENT FEDERAL QUESTIONS 
Although Judge Ebel raises strong points, I will assume that the ma-
jority correctly construes Malesko as holding that the existence of a state-
law remedy standing alone forecloses a Bivens action against employees 
of a federal contractor running a private prison.155  Nevertheless, even if 
cases such as Mr. Peoples’ are henceforth espoused under state-law theo-
ries of recovery, many will contain a federal question sufficient to re-
federalize the liability rule and provide for federal jurisdiction.  This path 
back to a federal question proceeds via two independent routes: the gov-
ernment contractor doctrine and the necessary construction test. 
A. The Government Contractor Doctrine 
Assuming the Tenth Circuit correctly interprets Malesko as fore-
closing a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor running 
a private prison when a state-law alternative action exists,156 the govern-
ment contractor doctrine provides an independent ground for re-
federalizing prisoner constitutional claims against employees of privately 
run federal prisons.157  The Peoples court does not address this issue.158  
Nonetheless, future prisoner plaintiffs in positions similar to Mr. Peoples 
may find themselves subject to a federal liability rule in a federal forum 
and possibly in a double bind—unable to bring a Bivens claim because of 
  
 154. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 155. But see Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (holding that Malesko does not mandate this result). 
 156. Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1103 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Therefore, we 
will not imply a Bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility when we con-
clude that there exists an alternative cause of action arising under . . . state . . .  law against the indi-
vidual defendant for the harm created by the constitutional deprivation.”). 
 157. For general discussions of the government contractor doctrine see: Kenneth G. English, 
Note, Government Complicity and a Government Contractor’s Liability in Qui Tam and Tort Cases, 
33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 649 (2004) (critiquing government contractor doctrine as economically ineffi-
cient); Mazefsky, supra note 12, at 659−61 (discussing the government contractor doctrine as it is 
addressed in Malesko); Sean Watts, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the Government 
Contractor Defense: An Analysis Based on the Current Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 687 (1999) (arguing for Congressional action to resolve doctrinal confusion 
in this area);  Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share 
the Sovereign’s Immunities From Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1997) (critiquing the 
extension of government immunities to institutions such as private prisons under the government 
contractor doctrine); Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: 
Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257 (1991) (providing an economic analysis 
of the government contractor doctrine); A.L. Haizlip, The Government Contractor Defense in Tort 
Liability: A Continuing Genesis, 19 PUB. CONT. L.J. 116 (1989). 
 158. Apparently the Tenth Circuit at one point considered a discussion of the government 
contractor doctrine.  Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 n.13 (“As we discussed above, the government 
contractor doctrine is not applicable because there is nothing in the record indicating that the Mar-
shal Service specifically ordered the monitoring of Mr. Peoples’s calls to his attorney.”).  But the 
opinion lacks any “discussion above.”  Presumably, the court decided a full discussion of govern-
ment contractor doctrine imprudent in this opinion. 
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the existence of an alternative state-law remedy yet finding their state-
law remedy preempted by federal common law. 
The Supreme Court’s leading government contractor doctrine case 
is Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,159 where the Court held that fed-
eral common law preempts state-law tort actions against independent 
contractors who manufacture munitions for the federal government.  In 
Boyle, a copilot of a Marine Sikorsky helicopter drowned following its 
crash into the Atlantic.  His estate brought a successful state-law tort 
claim against Sikorsky, contending that the outward-opening escape 
hatch was ineffective in an underwater crash and that its handle was ob-
structed by other equipment.160  The Court overturned the jury verdict on 
the grounds that the government contractor defense, as a matter of fed-
eral common law, preempted the state-law claim.161   
The Court reasoned that federal common law preempts state law   
where there is a uniquely federal interest and there is a significant con-
flict between federal policy and the operation of state law.162  The Court 
found these criteria met in Boyle.  The Court noted that without govern-
ment-contractor immunity “the contractor will [either] decline to manu-
facture the design specified by the government, or it will raise its 
price.”163  Next, the Court feared that the threat of state-law liability 
would interfere with the Government’s legitimate balancing of safety 
features against military efficacy in designing war materiel.164  The Court 
then fashioned a three-prong test to determine when a defendant has suc-
cessfully asserted a defense under the government contractor doctrine.  
To wit, state-law liability for design defects in military equipment is pre-
empted by federal common law when: (1) the United States approved 
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those 
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the 
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but 
not to the United States.165 
The lower federal courts have since split on the scope of the federal 
contractor doctrine outside of the military supplier context.166  A minor-
ity of courts refuse to apply the doctrine outside of military procurement 
cases.167  A majority of courts, however, apply the government contractor 
  
 159. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 160. Id. at 503. 
 161. Id. at 512. 
 162. Id. at 507−08. 
 163. Id. at 507. 
 164. Id. at 511. 
 165. Id. at 512. 
 166. See Hazel Glenn Beh, The Government Contractor Defense: When Do Governmental 
Interests Justify Excusing A Manufacturer’s Liability for Defective Products?, 28 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 430, 432 (1998). 
 167. Id. 
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doctrine in any scenario that satisfies the Boyle three part test.168  As the 
Eleventh Circuit noted, the history of the government contractor doctrine 
and its general rationale lend support to the conclusion that it would be 
illogical to limit the availability of the doctrine solely to military contrac-
tors.169  To this end, the doctrine has been applied to cases involving 
“manufacturers of letter sorting equipment for the United States Postal 
Service; postal vehicles; ambulances; military air conditioners; army 
surplus tree-trimming belts; service contracts for the Department of En-
ergy; a security guard service for a federal building; and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency.”170 
While the Supreme Court has not definitively held that the govern-
ment contractor doctrine applies to private prisons, the Malesko Court 
suggested that it would.  In a footnote citing Boyle, the Court stated, 
“Where the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing 
that is the subject of the claim, we have recognized this as a special cir-
cumstance where the contractor may assert [federal preemption].  The 
record here would provide no basis for such a defense.”171  Thus, it ap-
pears that the Court, given an appropriate set of facts, would find the 
government contractor doctrine applicable to suits brought by prisoners 
held in privately run federal prisons.  Indeed, the lower courts in the 
Malesko litigation assumed that the government contractor doctrine 
could apply and gave the argument full consideration.172   
Moreover, privately run federal prisons are currently attempting to 
use the government contractor doctrine as a bar to prisoner plaintiffs’ 
state-law claims.  Recently the Southern District of New York, sitting in 
diversity, considered a suit brought by two former female federal prison-
ers against a privately run federal prison alleging sexual misconduct by 
the prison’s guards.173  The plaintiffs brought two state-law causes of 
actionnegligent hiring and retaliation.174 
The private prison moved for summary judgment, inter alia, on the 
grounds that it was entitled to government contractor immunity.175  The 
District Court assumed that the doctrine was applicable outside of the 
  
 168. Id. 
 169. Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985).  See also Brown v. 
Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 588–89 (5th Cir. 1999) (extending the doctrine to protect persons 
from state-law liability when they in good faith assist the Government in law enforcement opera-
tions); Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying the doctrine in “ci-
vilian relationships” where “a contractor has acted in the sovereign’s stead and can prove the ele-
ments of the defense.”).  
 170. Beh, supra note 166, at 432. 
 171. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6 (2001); see also Mazefsky, supra note 
12, at 659−61 (discussing the government contractor doctrine as it is addressed in Malesko). 
 172. Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 
534 U.S. 61 (2001).   
 173. Adorno v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 174. Id. at 513. 
 175. Id. 
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military supplier context, but it held that, given the facts in the instant 
case, the private prison could not satisfy the three-part Boyle test.176  
In August 2005, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
heard a similar argument.  In Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.,177 Iraqi nationals 
who were held in a privately run federal prison in Iraq brought common 
law suits against the operator of the prison.  Among other defenses, the 
private prison argued that the plaintiffs’ common law claims were pre-
empted by the government contractor doctrine.178  The court held the 
doctrine applicable to private prisons, but as in the New York case, held 
that the facts did not support a finding that the Boyle three-prong test was 
met.179 
Given that the federal courts currently apply the government con-
tractor doctrine to claims brought against privately run federal prisons, 
many federal inmates who are denied a Bivens claim against guards on 
the basis that an alternative state-law claim exists may find they lack a 
viable state-law claim as well.  The Peoples case itself provides a prime 
example.  Recall, Mr. Peoples brought a Fifth Amendment due process 
claim arising out of his thirteen months of administrative segregation.  
This segregation was imposed by order of the Marshal Service, not by a 
discretionary act of the private prison.180  If Mr. Peoples had brought this 
claim under a state-law theory of recovery such as false imprisonment,181 
his claim would have been highly susceptible to the assertion of the gov-
ernment contractor doctrine because, as the Malesko Court put it, the 
Government “directed [the private prison] to do the very thing that is the 
subject of the claim.”182  Indeed, the three-prong Boyle test, at least based 
upon the scant factual background provided in the Peoples opinion, 
should be met here.  First, the Government, by ordering the administra-
tive segregation, approved a reasonably precise course of conduct.  Sec-
ond, the private prison followed those instructions.  Third, the Marshal 
Service was, presumably, aware of the constitutional implications of 
unjustifiably holding a pretrial detainee in administrative segregation.183  
  
 176. Id. at 521; see Scainetti v. United States ex rel. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 01 Civ. 
9970 (SHS), 2002 WL 31844920, *1 (S.D.N.Y.  Dec. 18, 2002) (unpublished) (noting that the 
Southern District of New York previously faced nearly identical government contractor arguments 
and applied nearly the same reasoning); Norwood v. Esmor Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8281 (LAP), 1997 WL 
65913, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997) (unpublished). 
 177. 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).   
 178. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 16.  
 179. Id. at 17. 
 180. Peoples v. CCA Detentions Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 181. See Brown v. State, 927 P.2d 938, 940 (Kan. 1996) (providing elements of false impris-
onment); see also supra note 131. 
 182. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74  n.6. 
 183. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).  The reader will note 
a slight rephrasing of the Boyle test here given the change in context from ordering a product to 
ordering a course of conduct, which the author intends as mere change in the form of–not the sub-
stance of–the Boyle test.  Courts applying the test in the prison context adopt a similar formulation of 
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Hence, claims such as Mr. Peoples’s administrative segregation claim, if 
brought under a state-law theory of recovery, would likely be preempted 
under the government contractor doctrine. 
This conclusion should not be overstated.  As the Tenth Circuit has 
made clear in other contexts, “[t]he government contractor defense . . . 
[only applies] when the [contractor] has conformed to reasonably precise 
specifications established or approved by the government.”184  The Sec-
ond Circuit has suggested this same principle applies in privately run 
prison cases as well.  “The government contractor defense only shields a 
[privately run federal prison] from claims arising out of its actions where 
the government has exercised its discretion and judgment in approving 
precise specifications to which the contractor must adhere.”185   Given 
that the government contractor defense is essentially a claim that “[t]he 
Government made me do it,”186 it is not surprising that both the Southern 
District of New York and the District of Columbia District Courts have 
denied attempts by employees of privately run prisons to invoke the gov-
ernment contractor doctrine absent specific evidence that the Govern-
ment ordered the course of action bringing rise to the lawsuit.  But this is 
not to say that the doctrine could never be successfully invoked in cases, 
such as Peoples, where the Government did specifically order the con-
duct giving rise to the suit. 
Further, it is unclear what effect the preemption of state-law claims 
under the government contractor doctrine would have on the availability 
of a Bivens suit under the Peoples analysis.  The Tenth Circuit adjudi-
cated Mr. Peoples’s administrative segregation claim on its constitutional 
merits.187  The court thereby avoided the need to discuss preemption un-
der the government contractor doctrine.  Assuming there was an alterna-
tive state-law theory of recovery for the administrative segregation claim, 
such as false imprisonment,188 the court’s analysis leaves a significant 
question unanswered: if such a state-law false imprisonment claim were 
preempted by the federal contractor doctrine, would an alternative state-
law remedy be rendered unavailable, giving rise to a Bivens claim?  Al-
ternatively, if the government contractor doctrine is merely an affirma-
tive defense189 to an otherwise generally available state-law claim, would 
an alternative state-law claim be available (but unmeritorious) and hence 
  
the test.  See, e.g., Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd on other 
grounds, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 184. Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 185. Malesko, 229 F.3d at 382.   
 186. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 187. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Brown, 927 P.2d at 940 (providing elements of false imprisonment). 
 189. See Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The [gov-
ernment] contractor defense is an affirmative defense”) (note omitted); but see Ryan v. Dow Chemi-
cal Co., 781 F. Supp. 934, 944−45 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting the considerable confusion as to whether 
Boyle lays down a “defense” or a “standard of liability.”). 
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a Bivens claim inappropriate?   If the former is the Tenth Circuit’s ap-
proach, then the case-by-case analysis regarding the implication of 
Bivens claims has become even more complicated and fact intensive (and 
hence unworkable) than Judge Ebel describes in his dissent.190  If the 
latter is the Tenth Circuit’s approach, then prisoner plaintiffs such as Mr. 
Peoples are stuck in a double bindthe alternative state-law claim bars a 
Bivens claim yet the government contractor doctrine preempts their state-
law claim.  Either approach appears unseemly.   
Finally, the Peoples approach will not relieve the federal courts of 
the burden of sorting through this conundrum, because the presentation 
of the government contractor defense provides grounds for removal un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).  Although the well-pleaded complaint rule 
generally limits jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  § 1331 to federal questions 
raised in the complaint (i.e., federal defenses do not give rise to federal 
jurisdiction under § 1331),191 the constitutional grant of federal jurisdic-
tion provides a broader scope of federal question jurisdiction than is 
found under § 1331.192  As the Court has noted, Congress invoked this 
broader scope of constitutional federal question jurisdiction by enacting 
§ 1441(a)(1), which allows defendants, acting under color of federal au-
thority, to remove to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, con-
trary to the dictates of the well-pleaded complaint rule.193  Generally 
speaking, a private defendant may remove under § 1442(a)(1) if it: (a) 
demonstrates that it acted under the direction of a federal officer; (b) 
raises a federal defense to plaintiffs’ claims; and (c) demonstrates a 
causal nexus between plaintiffs’ claims and acts it performed under color 
of federal office.194  Following this line of analysis, numerous federal 
courts have allowed private defendants to remove to federal court on the 
basis of the Boyle federal contractor doctrine.195  Thus, Peoples may send 
  
 190. See Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1112 (Ebel, J., dissenting). 
 191. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (stating that the 
well-pleaded complaint rule is an interpretation of § 1331, not of Article III); Louisville & Nashville 
Rail Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing the rule). 
 192. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (prescribing the limits of subject matter jurisdiction for the federal 
courts); see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822–23 (1824) (holding that any 
federal “ingredient” is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's federal question jurisdiction parame-
ters), for a discussion on federal question jurisdiction, as a matter of Constitutional law, jurisdiction 
“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” is quite broad.  
 193. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (“The removal statute itself . . . serves to 
overcome the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule which would otherwise preclude removal even if a 
federal defense were alleged.”). 
 194. See generally 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3727 (3d ed. 1998).   
 195. See, e.g., McAboy v. IMO Indus., No. C05-124L, 2005 WL 2898047, *3–*5 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 27, 2005) (slip op.); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446–51 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Carter ex. rel. Estate of Carter v. Acands, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-00009 2002 WL 
31682352, *3–*5 (E.D. Tex. June 27, 2002) (unpublished); Good v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 
914 F. Supp. 1125, 1127-28 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Guillory v. Ree's Contract Serv. Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344, 
346 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Crocker v. Borden, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. La. 1994); Akin v. 
Big Three Indus., 851 F. Supp. 819, 823 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Pack v. AC & S, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1099, 
1103 (D. Md. 1993); Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 573 (N.D. Cal. 1992); but see Kristina 
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many federal-prisoner plaintiffs out in search of a state-law theory of 
recovery only to have many of these plaintiffs (assuming the courts es-
chew the double-bind difficulty outlined above) return to federal court 
with a federal standard of liability.   
B. The Necessary Construction Test 
It is not only defendants, however, who may assert that putative 
constitutional claims brought under the auspices of a state-law theory of 
recovery raise federal issues.  Under the Peoples decision, many plain-
tiffs’ claims may raise substantial issues of federal law in their state-law 
theories on the face of the complaint by invoking the Constitution as the 
standard of care.  Under the jurisdictional doctrine famously espoused in 
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.196 and recently reaffirmed in 
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufac-
turing,197 if a state law claim necessarily requires the resolution of a sub-
stantial issue of federal law, then the state-law claim will arise under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  Given that many state-law tort claims brought by federal 
prisoner plaintiffs against defendants acting under color of federal law 
will look to the constitutional standard as the appropriate duty of care, 
these suits may well fall within the scope of Smith and Grable & Sons, 
once again re-federalizing these claims.  
The Court has established two independent tests for meeting the  
§ 1331 grant of jurisdiction.  The Court has long held that a suit arises 
under § 1331 if federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause of action.198  As 
this understanding of § 1331 was forcefully put forward by Justice 
Holmes, this view is oft referred to as the “Holmes test.”  The majority of 
federal-question-jurisdiction cases find their way into federal court by 
satisfying the Holmes test.199  The Holmes test, however, best operates as 
a rule of inclusion not exclusion (i.e., it provides a sufficient, but not 
necessary, ground for federal question jurisdiction).200  Federal question 
jurisdiction can also arise under § 1331 if vindication of the plaintiff’s 
state-law cause of action necessarily requires the construction of a sub-
stantial issue of federal law (“the necessary construction test”).201  While 
  
L. Garcia, The Boyle Festers: How Lax Causal Nexus Requirements and the “Federal Contractor 
Defense” are Leading to a Disruption of Comity under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), 46 EMORY L.J. 1629 (1997) (critiquing the practice of allowing private parties 
to remove to federal court by coupling the federal contractor doctrine and § 1442(a)(1)). 
 196. 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). 
 197. 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367 (2005). 
 198. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).   
 199. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808. 
 200. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.); see also 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983). 
 201. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2366−68; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808–09; Smith, 255 U.S. 
at 199; see also Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of 
Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private Transnational Litigation, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 2408, 2415 (2002) (employing the moniker “necessary construction test” for this 
font of federal question jurisdiction). 
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the Supreme Court instructs that the necessary construction test should 
be applied with caution as this realm of jurisdiction lies at the outer 
reaches of § 1331,202 and that the imbedded question of federal law must 
be substantial,203 the Court itself and the courts of appeals continue to 
apply the doctrine.204 
Indeed, for nearly one hundred years, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that federal question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that 
raise significant federal issues, of which the Smith case is the classic ex-
ample.205   In Smith, a stockholder sued in federal court to enjoin his cor-
poration from purchasing bonds issued pursuant to the Federal Farm 
Loan Act.206  The plaintiff’s theory of the case was that such a purchase 
would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Missouri law because 
the corporation could only purchase bonds “authorized to be issued by a 
valid law” and that the Federal Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional.207  
Although the plaintiff pursued a state-law cause of action, the Court held 
  
 202. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810. 
 203. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (holding that 
plaintiff's right to relief must necessarily depend upon the “resolution of a substantial question of 
federal law”); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (holding that cases that present issues merely colorable as 
federal or unreasonably relying upon federal law are not proper grounds for federal question jurisdic-
tion).   
 204. See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368 (taking federal question jurisdiction over a 
quiet title action as resolution of the state-law claim required a determination of whether the Internal 
Revenue Service had given adequate notice of sale); U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 
383, 388–91 (3d Cir. 2002) (taking federal question jurisdiction over malicious prosecution claim 
that required the construction of federal maritime law); Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 
22, 25–27 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding federal question jurisdiction lies in case to overturn arbitration 
award based upon negligent interpretation of federal law); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 
540, 542–43 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding federal question jurisdiction lies in case involving state tort 
claim that could affect foreign mining industry, because the case implicated significant foreign 
policy considerations); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. FlowData, Inc., 986 F.2d 
476, 477–79 (Fed Cir. 1993) (taking federal question jurisdiction over state-law business tort when 
ownership of federal patent was the decisive issue); Garvin v. Alumax of S.C., Inc., 787 F.2d 910, 
911–15 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding federal question jurisdiction over state tort claim against manufac-
turer and owner of a ship loader because plaintiff's ability to proceed in the face of a state law im-
munity defense turned on plaintiff's asserted claim that the immunity defense was preempted by the 
Federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act); W. 14th St. Commercial Corp. 
v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 192–96 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding federal question jurisdic-
tion over claim for declaratory judgment that defendant breached a lease in violation of the Federal 
Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act even though that Act provided no federal cause of 
action); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 194, § 3564; Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: 
Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 
2291–93 (2002) [hereinafter Mr. Smith] (arguing that the necessary construction test should be 
delimited by the principles of comity between federal and state courts and unique federal compe-
tency); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Fed-
eral Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1788−94 
(1992) (providing a thorough analysis of the necessary construction test).  This is not to say that the 
application of this doctrine is without confusion or frustration.  See Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 
212 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has periodically affirmed this basis for juris-
diction [i.e., the necessary construction test] in the abstract . . . , occasionally cast doubt upon it, 
rarely applied it in practice, and left the very scope of the concept unclear.”). 
 205. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367. 
 206. Smith, 255 U.S. at 195. 
 207. Id. at 198. 
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that if on the face of the complaint plaintiff’s right to relief depends upon 
the construction of a significant issue of federal law, then federal ques-
tion jurisdiction arises under the predecessor statute to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.208  In so doing, the Court found that a plaintiff could avail himself 
of a federal forum on a state-law theory of recovery without being di-
verse from the defendant because plaintiff’s Missouri cause of action 
necessarily required the court to pass upon the constitutionality of a fed-
eral act.   
Despite the potential for the necessary construction test to be the 
exception that swallowed the rule, the Supreme Court has not “treated 
‘federal issue’ as a password opening federal courts to any state action 
embracing a point of federal law.”209  Indeed, it has consistently held that 
the necessary construction test “must be read with caution.”210  To this 
end, the Court has required that the imbedded federal issue in the state-
law claim be a substantial one in order to invoke federal question juris-
diction under the necessary construction test.211  Further, the Court re-
cently clarified that presenting a substantial federal issue imbedded in a 
state-law cause of action is not sufficient for jurisdiction to arise under § 
1331.212  The federal courts must also consider congressional intent be-
fore taking jurisdiction under the necessary construction test.213  As the 
Court put it, “the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum 
only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment 
about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts gov-
erning the application of § 1331.”214   
While these limitations on the application of the necessary construc-
tion test are considerable, many putative constitutional torts, such as 
those in the Peoples case, could be re-federalized under the necessary 
construction test.  Consider again Mr. Peoples’s Fifth Amendment due 
process claim arising out of his thirteen months of administrative segre-
gation.  If Mr. Peoples had brought this claim under a state-law theory of 
recovery such as false imprisonment,215 it may well have raised an actu-
ally disputed and substantial issue of federal law.216   
  
 208. Id. at 199; see also Kaighn Smith, Jr., Federal Courts, State Power, and Indian Tribes: 
Confronting the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 35 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (discussing Smith). 
 209. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 210. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809. 
 211. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367; City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 
156, 164 (1997); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988); Merrell 
Dow, 478 U.S. at 814; Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27–28; Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 
299 U.S. 109, 117−18 (1936); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199; Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 
(1912). 
 212. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367. 
 213. See Mr. Smith, supra note 204, at 2290−91 (foreshadowing the Grable & Sons Court’s 
comity discussion). 
 214. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367; see also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8. 
 215. See Brown, 927 P.2d at 940 (providing elements of false imprisonment). 
 216. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368. 
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Under Kansas law, for example, false imprisonment may be brought 
to remedy “any unlawful physical restraint by one of another’s liberty, 
whether in prison or elsewhere.”217  Thus, a necessary element for plain-
tiff to prove is that defendant acted unlawfully.  In many states, it is set-
tled that to bring a claim of false imprisonment against a defendant act-
ing under color of law, plaintiff must prove that defendant violated the 
constitutional standard of care set by the Fourth Amendment.218  In these 
states, then, because an element of the state-law false imprisonment 
claim necessarily requires the court to make a determination of whether 
defendant’s actions comported with the strictures of the Fourth Amend-
ment, a substantial federal issue will be raised.219  Moreover, this neces-
sary construction of constitutional law is not unique to false imprison-
ment claims against defendants acting under color of law; many putative 
constitutional torts brought under other state-law theories will raise simi-
lar questions of constitutional law.220  Of course, mere reference to fed-
eral law as part of a state-law claim is insufficient to implicate federal 
question jurisdiction under the necessary construction test.221  Similarly, 
ministerial application of federal law in a state-law analysis is insuffi-
cient to invoke federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 pursuant to the 
  
 217. Arceo v. City of Junction City, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1086 (D. Kan. 2002) (quoting 
Gariety v. Fleming, 245 P. 1054, 1055 (Kan. 1926)). 
 218. See, e.g., Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 246–48 (Ala. 2000) (holding state-law torts of 
assault, unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and conspiracy barred as a matter of law because officer 
met the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard when detaining plaintiff); Susag v. City of 
Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 278–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that state-law claims of 
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment fail as a matter of law 
because plaintiff “did not meet his burden of producing evidence showing they used physical force 
against or exerted authority over him that resulted in a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.”); 
State v. Hall, 716 A.2d 335, 337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (holding existence of constitutional 
probable cause bars state-law claim of false imprisonment); Sanducci v. City of Hoboken, 719 A.2d 
160, 166 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) (dismissing plaintiff’s state-law false imprisonment claim 
because defendant met the constitutional probable cause standard); Renk v. City of Pittsburg, 641 
A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (false imprisonment plaintiff must show that defendant’s actions were 
unlawful, which often amounts to whether defendant acting under color of law had probable cause).  
One must not mistakenly find, however, that because a defendant is liable for a state-law false im-
prisonment claim that defendant is necessarily liable under the Fourth Amendment.  Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146–47 (1979) (“Just as ‘[m]edical malpractice does not become a consti-
tutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner,’ false imprisonment does not become a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.”). 
 219. In other states this issue is an affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Miller v. City of Jacksonville, 
603 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Broughton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310, 315 (N.Y. 
1975) (noting that under New York law, “[j]ustification may be established by showing that the 
arrest was based on probable cause.”).  In these jurisdictions, a privately employed federal prison 
guard may well have a sufficient federal defense to remove to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1442(a)(1).  See supra Part III.A. 
 220. See, e.g., Ex parte Duvall, 782 So.2d at 246–48 (holding state-law torts of assault, unlaw-
ful arrest, and conspiracy barred because officer acted with probable cause); Susag, 115 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 278–279 (holding that plaintiff’s claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress fail because defendant acted with probable cause). 
 221. See, e.g., Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 53–55 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding 
federal approval of Stock Exchange rules insufficient to take federal question jurisdiction in a state-
law tort case); Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 570–71 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(holding mere reference to federal labor laws that endorse collective bargaining agreements insuffi-
cient to take federal question jurisdiction over a contract claim).   
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necessary construction test.222  But in cases where the constitutionality of 
defendant’s conduct will be a central element of a plaintiff’s state-law 
cause of action, the federal question is substantial.223 
Furthermore, hearing putative constitutional claims brought by fed-
eral prisoners in federal court under the necessary construction test 
would not displace the congressionally mandated division of labor be-
tween the state and federal courts.224  When state-law causes of action, 
like those under consideration here, incorporate federal law as control-
ling an element of the claim, these claims are categorized as hybrid 
causes of action.225  Prior to Grable & Sons, some courts of appeals held 
the existence of a federal private right of action as the definitive factor 
for divining congressional intent on the propriety of taking federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over hybrid claims.226  Grable & Sons, however, makes 
clear that the existence of a federal private right of action is not required 
before taking federal question jurisdiction under the necessary construc-
tion test.227  Rather, the relevant question is whether taking jurisdiction 
over the claim “would . . . materially affect, or threaten to affect, the 
normal currents of litigation.”228  This boils down to a gate-keeping func-
tion.  The Court will not allow the necessary construction test to flood 
the federal courts, absent specific congressional approval or diversity, 
with suits that are traditionally the exclusive reserve of the state courts.229  
Following the Grable & Sons decision, the lower courts, while being 
  
 222. See, e.g., Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(holding federal law requiring certain banking contracts to be in writing insufficient to take federal 
question jurisdiction over a contract claim); Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that referencing a federal table of drugs insufficient to take federal question jurisdiction 
over a state statutory claim). 
 223. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12 (noting jurisdiction was appropriate in Smith 
because the federal issue raised was a constitutional one); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (holding plaintiff’s 
state-law claim, which necessarily requires inquiry in to constitutionality of federal act, arises under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331); Almond v. Capital Prop., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 22-24 (1st Cir. 2000) (taking federal 
question jurisdiction and noting that the federal interest is high where “important constitutional 
issues” are presented and low “where a state tort claim merely incorporate[s] a federal fault stan-
dard.”); Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 
1781, 1788 (1998) (“In Smith, the decision as to the constitutionality of the federal act would deter-
mine the continued vitality of the statute [and] all federal programs or conduct that were based on 
the statute.”).  But see Mr. Smith, supra note 204, at 2288 (critiquing this constitutional law versus 
statutory law dichotomy). 
 224. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368 (imposing this requirement for taking jurisdiction 
under the necessary construction test). 
 225. See Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the 
Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1148-57 (1985) (discussing creation 
of hybrid state law claims). 
 226. See, e.g., Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 223 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding the federal 
courts may not take federal question jurisdiction over state-law claims absent a federal private right 
of action).  See also TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 622 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000); Sparta 
Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209,1212(9th Cir. 1998); PCS 2000 
LP v. Romulus Telecomm., Inc, 148 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1998); Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 
764 (7th Cir. 1994); Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 227. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2369−70. 
 228. Id. at 2371. 
 229. Id. 
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careful not to open the doors of the federal courts to claims traditionally 
heard in the state courts, have injected a new-found life into the neces-
sary construction test.230   
In the context of federal prisoner litigation, federal jurisdiction un-
der the necessary construction test as delineated in Grable & Sons ap-
pears especially appropriate because this litigation has long taken place 
in federal court and Congress clearly envisions that the federal courts 
will bear the brunt of federal prisoner litigation.  Prior to the passage of 
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act231 (“PLRA”) in 1996, excluding ha-
beas corpus claims, the federal courts heard upwards of 40,000 prisoner-
plaintiff civil suits a year—approximately one-fifth of the overall civil 
federal docket.232  While the PLRA has limited the number of prisoner 
suits on the federal docket significantly, it has not altered the underlying 
fact that prisoner litigation is primarily conducted in the federal courts—
with approximately seventy-five percent of all prisoner civil litigation 
taking place in a federal forum.233  While Congress has sought to limit 
the flood of perceived frivolous prisoner litigation, it has done so with 
the clear intention that the federal courts will retain jurisdiction over 
these claims.  For example, the PLRA’s limitations on prisoner suits are 
limited to federal claims over which the federal courts could take federal 
question jurisdiction. 234  Moreover, Congress has enacted numerous 
other devices to control litigation by prisoner plaintiffs—from summary 
dismissal of frivolous cases235 to discovery rules236—that further evi-
dence that it envisions taking federal jurisdiction over large amounts of 
prisoner litigation in the federal courts.  Further, as the Court in Carl-
  
 230. See Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 194−96 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying 
Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over state-law contract claim that required construction of 
federal cable television law because taking this jurisdiction would not upset the flow of litigation in 
state and federal courts); Municipality of San Juan v. Corporacion Para El Fomento Economico De 
La Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 148 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Grable & Sons and taking juris-
diction over state-law contract claim that required construction of HUD regulations); Hayes v. 
American Airlines, Inc., No. 04CV3231CBAJMA, 2005 WL 2367623, *3−*4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2005) (unpublished) (applying Grable &Sons and taking jurisdiction over state-law unjust enrich-
ment claim because taking this jurisdiction would not upset the flow of litigation in state and federal 
courts); In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172−73 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(applying Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over state-law restitution claim);  Mr. Smith, supra 
note 204 at 2292–93; Redish, supra note 204, at 1793 (arguing that federal question jurisdiction over 
hybrid claim should lie to “increase the level of state-federal judicial interchange in the shaping and 
development of the relevant federal statute.”). 
 231. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A; 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1997-1997h (2005)). 
 232. Schlanger, supra note 6, at 1557 (this includes both state and federal prisoner suits). 
 233. Id. at 1573 n.52 (“a very gross estimate might be that about a quarter of what prison and 
jail officials think of as inmate litigation is currently filed in state court.”). 
 234. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d) (2005) (“The limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply to 
relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law.”).   
 235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2005) (screening prisoner cases for frivolousness prior to serving 
defendant). 
 236. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(E)(iii) (no required disclosures in prisoner-plaintiff cases). 
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son237 noted, Congress has approved of the Bivens cause of action (albeit 
after the fact) as a complementary theory of recovery to the Federal Torts 
Claims Act.238  In furtherance of this congressional acceptance of federal 
jurisdiction over Bivens claims, Congress created the Constitutional 
Torts Branch of the Department of Justice, which defends these actions 
exclusively in federal court.239  As these factors illustrate, there should be 
little concern that taking federal jurisdiction over putative constitutional 
torts espoused under a state-law theory of recovery “would . . . materially 
affect, or threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation” envisioned 
by Congress.240   
Under Grable & Sons, then, many putative constitutional claims 
filed by federal prisoners espousing a state-law theory of recovery may 
be re-federalized.  These hybrid cases will often raise substantial issues 
of constitutional law and taking federal jurisdiction over them will not 
materially alter the balance of federal-court versus state-court litigation.  
In so doing, courts will in effect employ a uniform federal standard of 
care and a federal forum will be accessible—as is the case for claims re-
federalized under the government contractor doctrine.  In substance, 
then, the goals the Bivens Court set out—uniform rules of liability en-
forceable in a federal court—will often be advanced in putative constitu-
tional tort litigation against federal actors, even as the form of the Bivens 
action withers.241 
CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that the current Supreme Court considers 
implying federal causes of action from federal statutes or the Constitu-
tion beyond its powers.242  The Tenth Circuit in its Peoples decision 
  
 237. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980). 
 238. The Federal Torts Claim Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2005).  As part of the 
Senate Report, Congress considered the interaction of the FTCA and Bivens:  
[A]fter the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are subjected to 
raids…will have a cause of action against the individual Federal agents and the Federal 
Government. Furthermore, this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens 
case and its progenty [sic ], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to 
make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that 
is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the 
individual Government officials involved). 
 S. REP. NO. 93-588 at 3 (1973). 
 239. See Pillard, supra note 62, at 66 n.6 (discussing the numbers of Bivens suits filed and 
their defense). 
 240. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2371. 
 241. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at  23 (“[T]he liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ 
constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules.”); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment “is not tied to the 
niceties of local trespass laws.”).  See also supra Part I discussing slow death of the Bivens cause of 
action. 
 242. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is 
a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action 
– decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition”); 
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grasps the Court’s directive and takes it (nearly) to its logical conclusion 
by foreclosing a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor 
running a private prison when an alternative state-law action exists.243  
Nevertheless, this victory for the opponents of implied federal causes of 
action may be Pyrrhic.  As I endeavored to illustrate above, many puta-
tive constitutional claims brought by federal prisoner plaintiffs under 
state-law theories of recovery may be re-federalized either as a matter of 
federal common law, under the government contractor doctrine, or pur-
suant to Byzantine jurisdictional doctrine, via the necessary construction 
test.   
All this is to illustrate a broader point.  Sharply distinguishing be-
tween federal common law and implied rights of action for the purpose 
of eliminating the latter is impracticable as these concepts differ only as a 
matter of degree, not as a matter of kind.244  First of all, most scholars 
consider the Bivens action to be merely a species of federal common 
law,245 rendering the federal common law versus implied cause of action 
distinction moot.  Even if one does not consider Bivens an instance of 
federal common law, numerous scholars have argued that there is no 
meaningful difference between the “legitimate” practice of inferring a 
federal liability rule sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction 
without congressional pre-approval as a matter of federal common law246 
  
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (abandoning the power of federal courts to imply 
federal causes of action from statutes). 
 243. Peoples v. CCA Detentions Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1105 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 244. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 4–6 (contending that federal common law and implied causes 
of action differ only as a matter of degree). 
 245. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 405 (Harlan, J., 
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and the “illegitimate” practice of inferring a federal liability rule suffi-
cient to confer federal question jurisdiction without congressional pre-
approval by inferring a cause of action.247   
The Peoples case proves this point.  Under the Peoples regime, the 
implied Bivens cause of action against employees of private federal pris-
ons is expunged from the federal courts in form only, not in substance.  
Uniform federal rules of liability will come to govern many constitu-
tional violations committed by privately employed custodians of federal 
prisoners by other means.  The slow death of the Bivens cause of action, 
then, has only made application of these uniform federal judge-made 
rules conceptually more difficult to apply; it does not eliminate them.  
Should the Supreme Court truly desire to end the substance—not merely 
the form—of the implied federal cause of action, it may well need to 
excise huge swathes of federal common law and fonts of jurisdiction.  
But such a pill may be too bitter to swallow.248 
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